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EVIDENCE, ENTITLED BELIEF, 
AND THE GOSPELS 
Nicholas Wolterstorff 
In this paper I discuss the conditions under which a person is entitled to believe the 
gospels. And in particular, I have my eye on the Enlightenment thesis that one is not 
entitled to do so unless one has collected adequate evidence concerning the reliability of 
the writers and the content of what they said, and has adequately appraised this evidence. 
There is no way of answering our question, however, without asking it with respect to 
some interpretation of the gospels. Accordingly I explain and use Hans Frei's contention, 
that the gospels are identity narratives concerning Jesus of Nazareth. 
Human beings in good measure live by tradition until their traditions are in crisis. 
The philosophers of the Enlightenment regarded the traditions of Europe as in 
deep crisis. In their judgment those traditions were the cause of pervasive 
benightedness, chicanery, and oppression. But even apart from that, the Refor-
mation had fragmented the moral and religious traditions of Europe so that even 
if one still wished to live by tradition, one now had to choose which one. 
It was in full awareness of this social crisis, and in response thereto, that the 
proto-Enlightenment philosopher John Locke insisted that, insofar as the press 
of one's other obligations permitted, one ought to examine what is handed over 
to one as tradition before accepting it. Of course Socrates had long before insisted 
on examining tradition. For Socrates, examination was a social enterprise, of 
one person propounding a thesis and others offering refutations-the Socratic 
elenchos. The examination proposed by Locke and embraced by the Enlighten-
ment was different, not inherently social: Given a thesis, one first collects 
adequate evidence pro and con; one then adequately scrutinizes the relation of 
the thesis to the evidence so as to determine the probability of the former on the 
latter; and finally, one believes or disbelieves the thesis with a firmness propor-
tioned to the probability one has determined it to have on the evidence. For the 
sake of convenience, let me call this complex activity, the evidential activity. 
Some propositions are immediately evident to one or seen by one to be entailed 
by such. For such, one need not perform the evidential activity. But for any 
other proposition, being entitled to believe it is conditional on one's performance 
of this evidential activity-once again, insofar as time permits. In particular, 
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being entitled to accept what is handed down as tradition is conditional on having 
performed the evidential activity. 
At the center of the moral and religious traditions of the West was the Bible-
handed down as tradition and within tradition. The thinkers of the Enlightenment, 
including Locke, did not shrink from applying their entitlement thesis to believing 
the Bible. Some thought that the result of practicing the evidential activity on 
religious convictions would be the disappearance of "revealed religion" in favor, 
at most, of "natural religion." Others did not anticipate this result. But all agreed 
that one is entitled to believe what the biblical writers say only if one has first 
performed the evidential activity on that. Sapere aude! 
In this paper I want to assess the acceptability of this "not entitled to ... un-
less" thesis concerning believing the Bible--or rather, I want to consider its 
acceptability for the gospels, not on this occasion for the Bible in general. My 
discussion will thus probe one of the deepest points of contact and conflict 
between the Christian tradition and the mentality of the Enlightenment-a men-
tality which in large measure became, and in large measure remains, the mentality 
of modernity. 
I shall not here ask what constitutes adequate evidence nor how one tells when 
one has it. Neither will I ask what constitutes adequate appraisal of evidence. 
Nor will I inquire into the nature of probability. All obscurities in these concepts-
and they are rich in obscurities-will on this occasion be set off to the side so 
that we can focus on the heart of the matter: Is it true that to be entitled to 
believe what the gospel writers say one must first do this other thing: Perform 
the evidential activity? On this occasion I shall not even inquire into the propor-
tionality thesis: That one ought to proportion the firmness of one's belief to the 
strength of one's evidence for it. 
Among those who have rejected the Lockean thesis, some have espoused 
alternative proposals as to things one must do before one is permitted to believe 
the gospels. Though here I cannot consider those alternative proposals, our 
discussion will provide material useful for appraising them. And by the end we 
will have learned something about the proper role of Reason and reasoning in 
our lives, and something about the dynamics which lead to acceptance of tradition 
and our obligations with respect to those dynamics. 
But there is an obstacle that the epistemologist must deal with before he can 
even set out on his inquiry. A vast variety of interpretations have been offered 
of the gospels. And different interpretations raise different epistemological issues; 
the epistemological considerations raised by Kant's interpretation are fundamen-
tally different from those raised by a "literalist" interpretation. Thus the epis-
temologist has to choose an interpretation, or type of interpretation, with which 
to work. How is he to make his choice? 
One feature of hermeneutics and epistemology in the contemporary world is 
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that they almost al ways go their separate ways. Especially is this true of hermeneu-
tics in the continental tradition and epistemology in the Anglo-American tradition. 
Each typically thinks the other obscure or naive or both. Because I regard this 
indifference and scorn as regrettable, my aim will be to work with an interpretation 
of the gospels which, in its main lines, not only seems plausible to me but has 
standing in the hermeneutical community. 
But let us back up a moment. Why not understand the activity of interpretation 
in general as the attempt to discover what a text says, and then pose our epis-
temological questions concerning what the gospel texts say? Why let hermeneutics 
get in the way of epistemology? 
The tempting answer is that there are disputes over what the gospel-texts say. 
The correct answer is that there is no such thing as what a text says. Of course, 
strictly and literally only persons say things, not texts. But that is not my point. 
Even in a metaphorical sense there is no such thing, for a text, as what it says. 
And so no such thing as discovering what it says. Interpretation, at bottom, is 
not a matter of discernment but of choice and habit. We human beings adopt 
interpretations of texts and follow rules which assign interpretations to texts-
often without deliberation. But for every text it is possible to adopt other interpre-
tations or follow other rules assigning interpretations. To arrive at an interpretation 
of a text one needs more than careful reading of the text. One needs a purpose 
which the interpretation is to serve or a criterion which it is to satisfy. Different 
purposes and criteria lead to different interpretations of the same text. 
Most of us most of the time for most texts want an interpretation which 
coincides with what the writer used the text to say. (Not with what he intended 
to use it to say; with what he did use it to say.) But sometimes we have goals 
which lead us to adopt other interpretations. The church in its liturgical use of 
the Psalms has long operated with interpretations far removed from what the 
original authors meant (said) with the text. 
In saying what I have been saying, what have I been taking an interpretation 
to be'? More specifically, what is the ontological status of that? An interpretation 
has, as its core, sequences of speech actions. And most of those speech actions 
can be onto logically assayed as states of affairs coupled with actions performed 
on those states of affairs: the action of asserting, of fictionalizing, or whatever. 
It is this core on which I shall focus my attention in what follows. Let it be 
added that this core does not exhaust what I mean by an interpretation. Texts 
typically have significance beyond the speech actions associated with them by 
the adoption of an interpretation; some of this also belongs to an interpretation.' 
By way of contrast to my usage here, there are things called "interpretations"-
Freudian interpretations, for example-which are not speech actions associated 
with a text but explanations of the origins of the text. 
I have not said, and will not try to say, what it is that one does with a text 
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and a sequence of speech actions when one adopts the latter as an interpretation 
of the former. The point I have wanted to make about adopting an interpretation 
is just that, for any text, one has options. Of course there are limits on the 
options. One cannot properly adopt a sequence of speech actions as an interpre-
tation of a text unless it is possible to perform those speech actions with that text. 
But if we are fully to understand why hermeneutics gets in the way of epis-
temology when we want to reflect on the phenomenon of accepting the gospels, 
we must do more than notice that, at bottom, interpretations of texts are to be 
adopted rather than discerned. For in principle there might be a standard interpre-
tation of the gospel texts in a certain community-in the church, for example. 
If there were, it would be eminently relevant to ask: Under what circumstances 
would one be entitled to believe the standard interpretation of the gospels? 
Though in the late antique and medieval worlds there was, apparently, a more 
or less standard interpretation of the gospels in the church, at least of their 
so-called "literal sense," that is no longer the case. Several developments have 
caused the change. Perhaps most important is that the canonical function of the 
gospels in the church, when combined with "the modem mind," gives powerful 
impetus to the devising of new interpretations. 
For a community to take a text as canonical is to bind itself to use that text 
in certain ways. Those ways may be, and usually are, diverse. The community, 
for example, may bind itself to use the text liturgically. Yet it is typical, if not 
definitive, of canonical functioning that the text is regarded and treated by the 
community as authoritative for its beliefs and practices. This, in tum, typically 
has two sides: the community binds itself to believe (some, at least, of) the 
content of the interpretations to be adopted of its texts. And the community binds 
itself to treat its interpretations as authoritative for the process of arriving at 
beliefs on other matters. My phrase, "the community binds itself to believe 
(treat),' is intentionally ambiguous. The members of the community may hold 
that they have an obligation to do this. Or they may hold that one has an obligation 
not to ally oneself with the community unless one does this. 
Imagine, then, a community and a text such that the members of the community 
believe that the text ought to function among them in ways which we (theoreti-
cians) would describe as functioning canonically. Sometimes there will be a 
preference in the community for a certain version of the text-the community 
may even authorize a certain version. And always in such a community there 
will be the social practice of interpreting the text. As a consequence of the 
presence of that practice there will be preferred (though usually, nonetheless, 
contested) methods of interpreting the text, maybe even authorized methods. 
And for some or all of the text there may even be an authorized interpretation. 
The more or less articulate views in the community as to the canonical functioning 
of the text will include views as to what in the acceptable interpretations is 
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authoritative for life, and for which dimensions of life it is authoritative. A 
community can take a text as authoritative without regarding everything in it as 
authoritative and without regarding all of life as falling under its authority. (For 
example, authoritative "for faith and morals" but not for science.) 
Now suppose someone argues to the community that at some points its hitherto-
acceptable interpretations of its hitherto-acceptable versions cannot function, or 
should not function, in accord with the community's convictions concerning the 
authority of such interpretations. Then, if the argument is at all persuasive, the 
community will be cast into crisis, be it major or minor. In the extreme case, 
the community will respond by removing the offending text from its canon. 
Short of that, it has a variety of ways of extricating itself from crisis. It can 
reject the argument and continue on its established course. Or conceding the 
cogency of the argument, it can change its views on canonical functioning, or 
adopt new interpretations, or (sometimes) embrace new versions of the text. 
What I have presented as a thought-experiment has in fact happened to the 
church in modem times with respect to its canonically functioning scriptures-in 
particular, with respect to the gospels. The church traditionally took the gospel 
writers to be assertively uttering the words of the text. And traditionally it took 
its commitment to the canonicity of these writings as including the obligation 
to believe what the writers said-the obligation to take as true the what-the-writer-
asserted interpretation of the text. But many over the past three centuries have 
argued that they cannot, or that we should not, believe all that. This has loosed 
the whirlwind. All the strategies mentioned above have been followed without, 
for very many of the predicaments, consensus emerging as to which strategy is 
best. However, in many cases members of the church, wishing to preserve the 
canonical status of the gospels but finding themselves incapable of believing the 
older interpretations, have sought to ease the tension by adopting new interpre-
tations. Thus it is that there is no longer such a thing as a standard interpretation. 
What have been the claims of the dissenters? Many different claims. But four 
sorts have been prominent: 
(1) That among the gospels there are discrepancies of such a sort that the 
members of a pair of writers cannot both be correct in what they claim to have 
happened. 
(2) That we have good and sufficient reason, from sources external to the 
gospels, to suppose that some of the events which the writers claim to have 
happened did not happen-that we have good and sufficient reason, for example, 
to not believe that Jesus performed the "signs and wonders" attributed to him. 2 
(3) That we have good and sufficient reason to suppose that the interpretation 
of the identity of Jesus which the gospel writers present is not accurate. 
(4) That we have good and sufficient reason to suppose that what the gospel 
writers say is incorrect with respect to its 'particularity." 
434 Faith and Philosophy 
II 
All texts allow for different interpretations; and no longer is there in the church 
a standard interpretation of the gospels. That is what makes picking an interpre-
tation about which we can raise our epistemological question a problematical 
matter. Of course it remains open to pick as one's interpretation what the writer 
(redactor) used the text to say. But since there is a multiplicity of views as to 
what the gospel writers used their texts to say, this does not deliver us from our 
predicament. 
Perhaps, though, there is less reason for despair on this latter point than there 
appears to be. For perhaps most of the interpretations which have been proposed 
in modem times violate some general principle for determining what the writers 
used these texts to say. That, in any case, was the argument of Hans Frei in his 
now well-known book, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative." I propose making use 
of Frei's argument for our endeavor. 
The core of Frei's argument can be simply stated. Large parts of the Bible in 
general and of the gospels in particular, belong to the literary genre of realistic 
narrative. Any proposed interpretation of the gospels which does not appro-
priately acknowledge that genre of the text is unacceptable as a construal of what 
the gospel writers meant. In fact, however, most of the innovative interpretations 
offered over the last two centuries violate this criterion. S 
Frei always credited Erich Auerbach's Mimesis with first delineating the genre 
of realistic narrative and with pointing out that the gospels, for the most part, 
belong to that genre. Let me quote, somewhat lengthily, Frei's best delineation 
of the genre: 
By speaking of the narrative shape of these accounts, I suggest that 
what they are about and how they make sense are functions of the 
depiction or narrative rendering of the events constituting them-
including their being rendered, at least partially, by the device of 
chronological sequence .... There are, of course, other kinds of stories 
that merely illustrate something we already know; and there are other 
stories yet that function in such a way as to express or conjure up an 
insight or an affective state that is beyond any and all depiction so that 
stories, though inadequate, are best fitted for the purpose because they 
are evocations, if not invocations, of a common archetypal consciousness 
or a common faith. In both of these latter cases the particular rendering 
is not indispensable, though it may be helpful to the point being 
made .... 
This is one of the chief characteristics of a narrative that is "realistic." 
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In that term I include more than the indispensability of the narrative 
shape, including chronological sequence, to the meaning, theme, or 
subject matter of the story. The term realistic I take also to imply that 
the narrative depiction is of that peculiar sort in which characters or 
individual persons, in their internal depth or subjectivity as well as in 
their capacity as doers and sufferers of actions or events, are firmly and 
significantly set in the context of the external environment, natural but 
more particularly social. Realistic narrative is that kind in which subject 
and social setting belong together, and characters and external cir-
cumstances fitly render each other. Neither character nor circumstance 
separately, nor yet their interaction, is a shadow of something else more 
real or more significant. Nor is the one more important than the other 
in the story. "What is character but the determination of incident? What 
is incident but the illustration of character?" asked Henry James. 
In all these respects-inseparability of subject matter from its depic-
tion or cumulative rendering, literal rather than symbolic quality of the 
human subject and his social context, mutual rendering of character, 
circumstance, and their interaction-a realistic narrative is like a histor-
ical account. 6 
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From this it is clear that, on Frei' s view, there are two defining marks of 
realistic narrative. The one he mentions first is the one to which he most often 
appeals in his rejection of a wide range of modem interpretations of the gospels. 
The second-which unlike the first is strictly a genre of projected world rather 
than of text--comes to the fore when he elucidates the structure of his own 
interpretation of the gospels in his later book, The Identity of Jesus Christ. 
What exactly is that first characteristic? Let me put into my own words what 
seems to me Frei's point. In an earlier work of mine, Works and Worlds of Art,7 
I developed the notion of the projected world of a text for the author: that 
conjunction of states of affairs such that the author's inscription of the text counts 
as his performing one and another kind of mood-action on those states of affairs. 
The projected world is that, along with whatever else would be appropriately 
extrapolated from that conjunction. Shortly I will clarify the notion of counting 
as. As to my neologism, "mood-action," I think its meaning will be communicated 
sufficiently for our purposes here if I cite just a few examples: asserting, com-
manding, asking, and fictionally presenting. 
The fact that I do speak simply of the projected world of a text but rather of 
the projected world of a text for its author reflects the point made earlier, that 
texts do not themselves say something. Frei, however, regularly talks as if texts 
do just say something, and thereby do just have correct interpretations. I think 
that is due, in whole or in part, to the fact that though he has his eye on projected 
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worlds, he speaks of these as the meanings of texts." For texts do just have 
meanings. A text is always a text in a language. It consists of a sequence of 
sentences in a language and those sentences have meanings in that language. 
But it is of prime importance to notice that the state of affairs we project with 
a sentence (and the mood in which we project it) can differ from one occasion 
to another without there being any difference of meaning in the sentence(s) we 
use. If you assertively utter "I feel dizzy" and I assertively utter "1 feel dizzy," 
there is no difference of meaning in the words we have uttered. Yet we have 
asserted different things. So too, if I use a word in some sentence literally and 
you use it metaphorically, our words will be the same and will mean the same; 
but we will have asserted different things. 
Of course the word "meaning" is a highly ambiguous word; one would not 
misuse it if one said, about the case just imagined, that you meant one thing, 
namely, that you felt dizzy, and that I meant a different thing, namely that I felt 
dizzy. It seems likely that what has happened to Frei is that the ambiguity of 
the word "meaning" has led him to speak of a text as just having a meaning, 
when what he has his eye on is the different phenomenon of someone meaning 
something by writing a text. A text's having a meaning is not to be identified 
with a person's meaning something with that text. Text-meaning is different 
from author-meaning. Frei's concern throughout is clearly with author-meaning. 
Let me now, for the moment, blend Frei's parlance with my own. The meaning 
of a realistic narrative text is its projected world, its story. And that, Frei adds, 
is the whole of its meaning. What is it that Frei wishes to claim by saying that 
this is the whole of its meaning? That is not entirely clear, partly because of the 
weight Frei places on the slippery word "meaning," partly also because he wishes 
to exclude a wide range of options all at once. Yet I think one can see what he 
is driving at. 
Frei characteristically says that it is a mistake to suppose that a realistic 
narrative is about something other than itself, a mistake to suppose that it refers 
to something other than itself, a mistake to suppose that its meaning lies outside 
itself. I think the best way to get a clear fix on the point Frei is driving at is to 
take two of his rejections as paradigmatic for what he wishes to reject in general. 
One sort of text which Frei cites as not belonging to the genre of realistic 
narrative is the fable-text. Aesop, by composing his fable-text, fictionally pro-
jected a story; and his doing that counted, in tum, as his asserting something 
else, namely, the 'moral.' Another type of text which Frei cites as not belonging 
to the genre of realistic narrative is the allegorical text. Bunyan, by composing 
his allegory-text, fictionally projected a story; and his doing that counted, in 
tum, as his assertive projection of another state of affairs-that one also sequential 
in structure. Generalizing from these examples, I suggest that the point Frei 
wishes to make is that realistic narrative texts are texts which are apt for pro-
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jecting---either in the assertive or the fictional mode-worlds which in their 
structure are 'realistic' narratives; and which are not apt for being used in such 
a way that one' s projection of that world (story) counts in turn as one's projecting 
of yet some other state of affairs. 
Of course Frei does not deny that realistic narrative texts often serve to express 
the feelings of their authors, are often genetically derived from historical episodes, 
often have consequences in the consciousness and lives of readers. But these 
are not, as he sees it, relationships of meaning. 9 Suppose we distinguish between 
two types of action-generation, that is, two ways of doing one thing by doing 
another: causal-generation and count-generation. By flipping the switch I turn 
on the light; the connection is a causal one. By turning on the blinkers I signal 
a left tum; the connection is that of one action counting as another. It appears 
to be Frei's intuition-sound one, I might add-that only count-generation yields 
meaning as he means 'meaning.' 
The next point in Frei's argument is his claim that most innovative modem 
proposals as to the author-meaning of the gospels are implausible, given the 
realistic-narrative genre of these texts. Some have proposed mythical interpreta-
tions. But these are obviously not myth texts, says Frei. Some have proposed 
allegorical interpretations. But these are not allegory texts. Some have proposed 
fable, or parable, interpretations. But these are not fable or parable texts (though 
they contain some parables). Some have proposed locating the 'meaning' of 
these texts in the consciousness of those who composed them. But the sole 
'meaning' of these texts is the story they are used to tell. Yet others have proposed 
identifying the 'meaning' of these texts with the various events that took place 
in first century Palestine which these texts are supposedly 'about.' But that is 
once again to fly in the face of the fact that the sole meaning of these texts is 
the story which they project. 
Frei offers an account of why this "eclipse" of biblical narrative took place. 
Commentators on the Bible down through the ages recognized the realistic nar-
rative character of large stretches of the biblical texts-in particular, of the 
gospels. They identified this history-like character of the text with the "literal" 
sense of the text; and they identified this, in tum, with the text's being about 
certain historical events (or perhaps Frei means to say, with the historical events 
that the text was supposedly about). "In the days before empirical philosophy, 
Deism, and historical criticism," says Frei, "the realistic feature had naturally 
been identified with the literal sense which in tum was automatically identical 
with reference to historical truth. "10 
But then arose the conviction that Jesus had not been resurrected, had not 
performed signs and wonders; etc. One possible response to this conviction, by 
those who shared it, would have been to conclude that the gospels perpetrated 
falsehoods. Very few chose this response, since almost all of them still embraced 
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the Bible as canon. II Hence the whirling search for alternative interpretations-a 
search which, in Frei's view, over and over bumps up against the stubbornly 
history-like (realistic narrative) character of these writings. 
Meaning and narrative shape bear significantly on each other. Even if 
one was convinced that the history-like or realistic character of the 
narratives finally bespoke an illusion, so that their true history either 
had to be reconstructed historically or their true sense explained as 
allegory or myth, the realistic character was still there. This led to the 
odd situation described above. Some commentators explained the 
realistic feature by claiming that the stories are reliably or unreliably 
reported history. Others insisted that they are not, or only incidentally, 
history and that their real meaning is unconnected with historical report-
ing. In either case, history or else allegory or myth, the meaning of the 
stories was finally something different from the stories or depictions 
themselves, despite the fact that this is contrary to the character of a 
realistic story. 12 
The solution, says Frei, is to recognize clearly that whether or not these are 
history-like is just a different issue from whether or not the author-meaning of 
these texts is accurate history. Frei speaks in the counterfactual mood in the 
following passage, but the thought expressed is his own: 
... in order to recognize the realistic narrative feature as a significant 
element in its own right (viz., as a story's making literal rather than alle-
gorical or mythical or some other nonliteral sense regardless of whether 
the literal sense is also a reliable factual report) one would have had to dis-
tinguish sharply between literal sense and historical reference. And then 
one would have had to allow the literal sense to stand as the meaning, even 
if one believed that the story does not refer historically. But commenta-
tors, especially those influenced by historical criticism, virtually to a man 
failed to understand what they had seen when they had recognized the 
realistic character of biblical narratives, because every time they acknowl-
edged it they thought this was identical with affirming not only the 
history-likeness but also a degree of historical likelihood of the stories. 
Those who wanted to affirm their historical factuality used the realistic 
character or history-likeness as evidence in favor of this claim, while 
those who denied the factuality also finally denied that the history-like-
ness was a cutting feature-thus in effect denying that they had seen 
what they had seen because (once again) they thought history-likeness 
identical with at least potentially true history. 
In both affirmative and negative cases, the confusion of history-like-
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ness (literal meaning) and history (ostensive reference), and the her-
meneutical reduction of the former to an aspect of the latter meant that 
one lacked the distinctive category and the appropriate interpretive pro-
cedure for understanding what one had actually recognized: the high 
significance of the literal, narrative shape of the stories for their meaning. 
And so, one might add, it has by and large remained ever since. 13 
III 
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The story is the meaning of the gospel text, says Frei. And acknowledging 
that the story is realistic (history-like) in character carries no implication what-
soever as to whether the story is accurate history, or even meant as history. 
Once these points are granted, then two very different projects loom before one: 
the project of historical criticism and the project of literary criticism. Frei' s great 
contribution was to have seen with clarity and argued with cogency that these 
are indeed two distinct projects. The gospels, he says, "tell a story of salvation, 
an inalienable ingredient of which is the rendering of Jesus as Messiah, 
and ... whether or not he was so in historical fact, or thought of himself as 
Messiah (i.e., whether the story refers or not) or whether the notion of a Messiah 
is still a meaningful notion, are different questions altogether. To the 'narrative' 
perspective, these latter questions would have to do not with meaning or her-
meneutics but with an entirely separable historical and theological judgment. "14 
But once the distinction is drawn clearly between the structure and character 
of the author-meaning of these texts, and the events of first-century Palestine, 
does not the person with religious interests tum from the former to the latter-from 
literary criticism to historical criticism? Does not Frei's argument have the con-
sequence, ironically, that the motivation for historical criticism is not diminished 
but clarified and strengthened? 
Eclipse gives no decisive answer to this question. It appears, however, to take 
the opposite tum from that proposed by this imagined objector. Frei shares the 
church's embrace of the Bible as canon. And he applauds what he describes as 
the "pre-modem" view that to accept the Bible as canon is to struggle to fit 
oneself into its storied universe. 15 For the person of religious concerns, the 
narrative counts. 
What is not at all clear is what Frei has in mind as his rationale for this view. 
Frei's pre-modem predecessors were clear: We try to fit ourselves into the biblical 
story because that story tells us what happened. Indeed, it tells us of the most 
important things that have ever happened. Our weal depends on how we relate 
ourselves to those happenings. In Eclipse Frei appears to reject this rationale. 
With what does he mean to replace it? Does he believe that the narrative all by 
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itself serves to 'edify' the church? 
The ambiguities of Eclipse are resolved by Frei's later book, The Identity of 
Jesus Christ. There he makes clear that he is not advocating a scripto-centric 
version of Christianity. In the Preface he says that he affirms the resurrection 
of Christ "as an indispensable Christian claim"; and the book itself is the out-
working of that affirmation. This affirmation does not lead Frei to plunge into 
historical criticism. That continues to be of little interest to him.16 Nonetheless 
he says that to be a believer is at some point to "make the transition from literary 
description to factual, historical, and theological judgment .... "17 
This position also counts as Frei's answer to another way of responding to 
his main argument. I have said that Frei, along with all or almost all of those 
he criticizes, was concerned with the author-meaning of the gospels. But suppose 
that someone proposes discarding this concern. That seems to me to have been, 
in fact, what Kant proposed in his Religion within the Limits of Reason. Of 
course anyone who proposes this still has to cope with the realistic narrative 
character of these texts. Nonetheless, one's freedom is at once expanded if one 
no longer aims to adopt an interpretation which coincides with the author-meaning 
of these texts. 
The terminology in which Frei conducts his argument prevents him from ever 
seeing this option with clarity. Yet one can surmise what his response would 
be. It would have two parts. The attempt to fit ourselves into the story projected 
by the gospel writers continues to be of benefit to the church. And whether or 
not Jesus had the identity that the gospel writers say he had/has remains of 
intense religious importance to the church, and indeed to all humanity. 
IV 
Before we tum to Frei's explication of the author-meaning of the gospels, let 
me reflect briefly on his picture of interpretation and explication as autonomous, 
texts-focussed, activities-a picture, I might add, that he shared with the New 
Critics in literary studies. I shall confine myself to points relevant to our project 
in this paper. 
Suppose one shares with Frei the goal of adopting as one's interpretation of 
a text that which the writer used the text to say. Then surely taking Flaubert's 
works as fiction rather than history belongs to adopting an interpretation of his 
text, as does taking Gibbon's works as history rather than fiction. For what 
someone used a text to say consists of the speech actions he performed by his 
use of the text. And a speech action consists not only of a state of affairs but 
of a stance taken up toward that state of affairs. Frei, however, regularly speaks 
of the interpreter as having nothing to say on the issue of whether the gospels 
were meant as fiction or history. He observes, correctly, that the texts can be 
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used either way. He also observes, again correctly, that though their history-like-
ness makes them suitable for history, it does not establish that the world they 
were used to project actually occurred. But from this it does not follow that 
hermeneutics is unconcerned with the determination: History or fiction. What 
the historian asserts may be false and what the fictioneer projects may be true. 
So truth and falsehood do not determine whether a text is used for history or 
fiction. That is determined by the mood of the projection. But the mood belongs 
to what the author meant with the text. 
Just as adopting an interpretation of a text is, in this way, not an autonomous, 
text-focussed, procedure, so also explicating an interpretation already adopted 
is not such a procedure. Consider the following passage from Frei's Eclipse: 
The position "thatthe authority of the Bible for belief is gone ... was universally 
rejected among theologians and non-theologians. One either claimed that the 
texts really do mean what they state, that salvation comes through Jesus Christ 
alone and that this is a significant and not an anachronistic statement; or else 
one said that this, taken literally, would be an insignificant statement and therefore 
cannot be what the texts mean."18 To this passage let us add a sentence which 
occurs just a bit more than a page later: "Hermeneutically, it may well be the 
most natural thing to say that what these accounts are about is the story of Jesus 
the Messiah, even if there was no such person .... "14 
Let us suppose that the gospel texts contain the sentences "Salvation comes 
through Jesus Christ alone" and "Jesus is the Messiah." Let us suppose further 
that the interpretation we want to adopt is that consisting of what the first 
writer/redactor of these gospel texts used them to say. We now want to get a 
firm grip on the actual structure and content of these interpretations-Dn the 
content of these projected-worlds-cum-modes-of-projection. We want, in short, 
to explicate our interpretation. 
So suppose that when the writer of the text wrote, "Salvation comes through 
Jesus Christ alone," he was referring to the existent person Jesus from Nazareth. 
Then for the projected state of affairs to occur there would have to be this person 
and salvation would have to come through him alone. Whether the world is 
projected in the assertive or in the fictive mood makes no difference to this. 
Now consider the alternative possibility. Suppose that Jesus from Nazareth 
had not existed. Then no one could refer to him, no one could tell a story about 
him; etc. Frei says that "even if there was no such person," nonetheless "what 
these accounts are about is the story of Jesus the Messiah." Perhaps that is 
true-though I myself would have said that the accounts present to us the story 
rather than that they are about the story. But in any case, if Jesus of Nazareth 
had not existed, then these accounts would not have been about him, the writers 
would not have referred to him, etc. And so, different states of affairs would 
have been projected, states of affairs which do not entail the existence of Jesus. 
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The projected worlds of the two cases are different. Hence it is that explication, 
understood as the procedure of describing the contents and structure of the 
interpretation adopted, is not an autonomous procedure, to be conducted simply 
by studying texts. What one judges to be the content of the interpretation depends 
(among other things) on which words of the text one takes to have been used 
to refer. And that is not, in general, to be determined by scrutinizing the words. 
But now thirdly, let us reflect on Frei's insistence that canonicity not be 
allowed to put pressure on hermeneutics. As we have seen, Frei operates with 
the assumption that a text inherently has a meaning; and he regards interpretation 
as the attempt to discern that meaning. If one thinks along these lines, then 
obviously canonicity is irrelevant to interpretation. 20 But once we see that arriving 
at an interpretation of a text presupposes an act of practical reason, then it is 
no longer obvious that a community's desire to use a text canonically is irrelevant 
to its choice as to which interpretation to adopt. Frei argues with great cogency 
that the genre of the gospel texts imposes stringent restrictions on what can 
properly be adopted as an interpretation-restrictions which most modem innova-
tive interpretations have violated. But it remains true that the genre does not 
close down the range of allowable interpretations to just one. 
I share Frei's assumption that there are powerful reasons, in the case of the 
gospels, for the church to adopt as its preferred interpretation that which the 
writers used these texts to say. 21 But for that choice, reasons are indeed needed; 
alternatives cannot all be dismissed out of hand as not even qualifying as interpre-
tations. And it would be wise to remember that the New Testament writers, in 
the interpretations they adopted of Old Testament texts, often chose differently. 
v 
Frei's project in The Identity of Jesus Christ was to explicate the overall 
structure of that interpretation of the gospels which he had adopted. Though the 
gospels are oriented entirely around the person Jesus of Nazareth, they are not 
biography in the contemporary mode. They are, says Frei, narratives designed 
to answer the question, "Who is Jesus"? They offer "a rendering of the identity 
of Jesus" in history-like form. 
Frei (along with most others) sees the gospel narratives as coming in three 
relatively distinct parts: Jesus before his public ministry; the public ministry; 
and the passion and resurrection of Jesus. Frei's view is that though we are not 
"to ignore the story of Jesus' ministry in identifying him ,"22 nonetheless 
" ... Jesus' individual identity comes to focus directly in the passion-resurrection 
narrative rather than in the account of his person and teaching in his earlier 
ministry. It is in this final and climactic sequence that the storied Jesus is most 
of all himself ... we are confronted with him directly as the unsubstitutable 
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individual who is what he does and undergoes and is manifested directly as who 
he is."23 And what is "the identity of Jesus," as presented in the gospels? 
He is the man from Nazareth who redeemed men by his helplessness, 
in perfect obedience enacting their good in their behalf. As that same 
one, he was raised from the dead and manifested to be the redeemer. 
As that same one, Jesus the redeemer, he cannot not live, and to conceive 
of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is. 24 
Though Frei is certainly right in claiming that Jesus' role of redeemer is 
essential to his identity as presented in the gospels, to me it appears that Jesus' 
role of authoritative spokesman for and about God is also essential. And if that 
is so, then the second main part of the gospel narratives, the part concerned with 
Jesus' public ministry, carries more significance than Frei grants to it. But that 
can pass here. For on his central claim, that the gospels are meant principally 
to answer the question, "Who was/is this person Jesus?"-about that, it seems 
to me, Frei is right. 
If the central purpose of these narratives is to depict the identity of Jesus, then 
the intent of the wri~ers is not frustrated if the story, in some of its details, does 
not match what actually transpired. For it may not have been the writers' intent 
that it would nor their claim that it did. So as to present the identity of Jesus 
the writers may sometimes have taken actual episodes but put them into a different 
order from that in which they actually occurred, have taken things Jesus said on 
separate occasions and put them into one unified speech, etc. And if that is so, 
then the attempt to figure out in detail, on the basis of the gospel narrative, what 
actually happened, is an enterprise whose results will always remain shaky. 25 
Nonetheless, "This one thing historians and novelists have in common," says 
Frei: "they deal with specific actions and specific human identities. If a novel-like 
account is about a person who is assumed to have lived, the question offactuality 
is virtually bound to arise, for psychological if no other reasons, either at specific 
points or over the whole stretch of the account. "26 We must keep in mind, indeed, 
that "the force or urgency of the question does not make a positive answer to it 
any more credible. "27 Yet the urgency is there. And it is especially powerful 
when it comes to the narrative of the resurrection. For here there is more involved 
than just the fact that "the resurrection account, by virtue of its exclusive reference 
to Jesus, ... allows and even forces us to ask the question, "Did this actually 
take place?"28 'The passion-resurrection account tends to force the question of 
factuality because the claim is involved as part of the very identity that is described 
as enacted and manifested in the story-event sequence. "29 That is to say: the 
identity of Jesus, as presented by the gospels, requires that he have been raised 
from the dead. The resurrection is essential to his presented identity. ',(D)isbelief 
in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally impossible," says Frei;3() by which he 
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means, "to conceive of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is."3! "To 
think him dead is the equivalent of not thinking of him at all."32 And so, since 
the identity of Jesus matters to us religiously, the historicity of his resurrection 
matters. 
At last, then, Frei poses the question: "What is involved in belief in the 
resurrection?" He makes one last bow to his long line of argument: "Having 
directed attention all along to the descriptive structure of the accounts and not 
the factual historicity of their contents, we must say that belief in Jesus' resur-
rection is more nearly a belief in something like the inspired quality of the 
accounts than in the theory that they reflect what 'actually took place. "'33 But 
then he adds: 
at one point a judgment of faith concerning the inspiration of the descrip-
tive contents and a judgment of faith affirming their central factual claim 
would have to coincide for the believer. He would have to affirm that 
the New Testament authors were right in insisting that it is more nearly 
correct to think of Jesus as factually raised, bodily if you will, than not 
to think of him in this manner. (But the qualification "more 
nearly ... than not" is important in order to guard against speculative 
explanations of the resurrection from theories of immortality, pos-
sibilities of visionary or auditory experience, possibilities of resuscitating 
dead bodies, miracles in general, etc.p4 
In what follows, I propose to work with Frei's explication ofthe author-meaning 
of the gospels. For this explication of this interpretation satisfies my initial 
requirement, that it not only seem plausible to me but have standing in the 
hermeneutical community. For those who do not wish to accept author-meaning 
as their interpretation, or dispute Frei's explication of that, what follows can be 
understood hypothetically: If this interpretation and explication are adopted, then 
what is to be said about conditions for being entitled to believe it? 
VI 
The question on everybody's lips was, "Who is this person Jesus?"-the 
mysterious wonder-working, Spirit-filled, charismatic sage and holy man from 
Nazareth who spoke "with authority." It was a question Jesus himself put to this 
disciples: "Who do men say that I am? And who do you say that I am?" In 
narrative fashion the gospel writers present their answer to the question. Their 
presentations were accepted by that element of the "Jesus-party" which became 
the church, and were handed down as canonical tradition. Presumably they were 
accepted because they themselves reflected tradition in the Jesus-party. Saying 
that he had tried to write "an orderly account," Luke compared his effort to 
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those of others who had "undertaken to compile a narrative of the things which 
have been accomplished among us." He suggested that he, along with those 
others, had based his narrative on what had been "delivered to us by those who 
were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word." The gospels are crystallized 
inscribed tradition. And at the bottom of that tradition is testimony. 
What is handed down as tradition can, in general, be accepted in two quite 
different ways. Sometimes one can inquire independently into its acceptability 
without taking one's predecessors at their word on anything relevant to the matter; 
that done, one may find oneself believing what they said, thus accepting the 
tradition. The other way of accepting what is handed down as tradition is to take 
one's predecessors at their word-to believe what they said on their say so, on 
their authority. To take their word for it. 
When tradition is complex, then sometimes one can blend these two. The 
blend may be of different sorts. One blend is this: If part of the tradition stands 
to other parts as evidence, and one discerns that it does, then one can accept 
the evidential part on sayso while determining for oneself whether the evidence 
supports the conclusion. 
Though perhaps there are some who accept everything that the gospel writers 
say on their sayso, there are many who accept what they say in the blended way 
suggested. However, no one (since the second century) who accepts what they 
say does so without taking them at their word on some historical matters. Inde-
pendent access to the propositions they assert is for us much too meager for it 
to be otherwise. Thus epistemological reflection on the phenomenon of accepting 
what the gospel writers say requires, unavoidably, reflection on the phenomenon 
of believing something on someone's sayso. Of course, if the gospel writers had 
not presented a narrative rendering of the identity of Jesus but propounded general 
moral claims, or general claims about the human condition, in highly pictorial 
language, then we might well have had independent access to the propositions 
they asserted and thus, in principle, found ourselves able to accept what they 
say without accepting any of it on their sayso. 
A necessary condition of believing something on someone' s sayso is believing 
it because he said so. His saying it must playa causal role in one's coming to 
believe. But how, more specifically, does the causal process go? 
There has to be available a language for saying things. And then, if I am to 
believe p on your sayso, you must use the language to say p and I, in the 
paradigmatic case, must have a good enough grasp of the language to discern 
that you said p. My discerning that you said p then causes in me the belief that 
p. Your sheer utterance of the words might also evoke beliefs in me, as might 
your manner of uttering them. And in the odd case, the belief evoked by the 
words or the manner might be a believing of the very same proposition that you 
asserted. But that would not be believing what you said on your sayso. 
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What is it to discern that you said p? It's at least this: to believe that you said 
p. It's more than this, though; because I might come to believe that you said p 
without discerning that you did. But this point leads us to consider whether 
believing something on someone' s sayso is a phenomenon which goes beyond 
the paradigmatic case in which I discern what you said. Suppose that I come to 
believe that you said p not by discerning that you did through attending to your 
words but by being told that you did, or inferring it. May I not nonetheless 
believe what you said on your sayso? It appears to me that 1 can. So I suggest 
that no matter how I come to believe that you said p, if I correctly believe that 
you said p, and this believing of mine immediately causes in me the belief that 
p, then I believe p on your sayso. 
What is the qualifier immediately meant to do here? It's meant to eliminate 
cases of rationally grounded inference to p from my belief that you said p, 
coupled with my belief that p is a logically or causally necessary condition of 
your saying p. Suppose I reason: "You said p; but you couldn't say p without 
p being true; so p." Then I don't believe p on your sayso. 
But suppose I have beliefs about the reliability of certain types of speech and 
that, appealing to some such conviction, I reason as follows: "Type such-and-such 
of speech is reliable; your saying p belongs to that type; so probably p." And 
suppose that this reasoning leads me to believe not just that probably p but that 
p. Or suppose my reasoning goes thus: Your sayingp belongs to a reliable speech 
type (i.e., some reliable speech type or other); so probably p. Is coming to 
believe p along these lines--call it reason-grounded believing-a case of 
believing p on your sayso? Surely it is. Thus the qualifier "immediately" in the 
principle formulated at the end of the next to last paragraph excludes cases which 
should not be excluded if it were to be formulated not only as a sufficient, but 
as a necessary, condition. 
One more point on the matter of identifying the phenomenon of believing on 
sayso. Suppose someone assertively utters "I believe it's snowing," and that my 
discerning that he said that causes me to believe that it's snowing. Might this 
not be a case of believing that it's snowing on his sayso? Yet it appears that he 
did not assert what I believe. For I believe that it's snowing. But he appears to 
have asserted that he believes that it's snowing. 
Appearances are deceiving. By uttering the sentence "I believe that it's snow-
ing," a person will normally assert not only that he believes it's snowing but 
that it's snowing. Such cases, then, leave the principle intact that only what one 
person asserts can another believe on his sayso. Of course it's possible to use 
the sentence without asserting that it's snowing-for example, by putting heavy 
stress on the word "believe": "I believe that it's snowing." If your saying that 
causes me to believe that it's snowing, then I will believe p not on your sayso 
but (probably) on what I take to be your sayso. We often believe something on 
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what we take to be someone's say so when it is not in fact on their sayso that 
we take it. 
VII 
One's believing that so-and-so said p causes in one the belief that p: This is 
the phenomenon that constitutes the heart of believing p on someone's sayso. 
One can understand why the Enlightenment philosophers were wary. Our human 
practice of drawing the appropriate conclusion from a modus ponens argument 
seems to have an eminently good rationale: We see that the conclusion follows. 
Except in the odd case, however, between that so-and-so said p and that p we 
do not see any relationship of entailment. Their solution was to insist that 
believing on say so ought always to be reason-grounded. And they spoke to the 
matter of the kinds of reasons and how we get them. 
We must in everything be guided by Reason, said Locke-by which he (and 
his followers) meant: By Reason plus immediate experience. Our beliefs must 
all be grounded on direct insight into reality. How else are we to be delivered 
from wandering in darkness? Specifically, then: Having discerned that someone 
said p, we must have available to us adequate evidence that his saying p belongs 
to a reliable speech-type; we must also have available adequate evidence, pro 
and con, concerning the truth of p itself; and only if p seems to us more probable 
than not on adequate scrutiny of all that evidence are we to believe p on sayso. 
Locke's insistence that it is possible to ground say so-believing entirely on 
insight was already decisively attacked by Hume. Hume argued that the inductive 
inference, from experienced samples of a certain speech-type to the belief that 
the speech-type as a whole is reliable, is unalterably a product of custom/habit 
rather than of rational insight. But though Hume thus destroyed the foundationalist 
underpinnings of Locke's thesis that we are entitled to believe something on 
sayso only if our doing so is reason-grounded and our reasons acquired by the 
evidential activity, I see no evidence that Hume disagreed with the thesis itself. 
After all, Hume too was a person of the Enlightenment, sharing its hostility to 
unexamined tradition. The honor offirst questioning the thesis belongs to Thomas 
Reid. 
Reid's reflections on the topic began with the question: What is the dynamic 
which accounts for our believing things on sayso? He conceded that sometimes 
what is at work is reasoning from beliefs produced by induction. But he argued 
that not all believing on sayso can be analyzed as being of the reason-grounded 
variety. Some is the output of what he dubbed the credulity principle, and which 
he held to be an innate "original principle of our constitution"35 implanted in us 
by God. His argument, persuasive in my judgment, went as follows: 
if nature had left the mind of the hearer in equilibria, without any 
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inclination to the side of belief more than to that of disbelief, we should 
take no man's word until we had positive evidence that he spoke 
truth . . . . It is evident, that, in the matter of testimony, the balance 
of human judgment is by nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns 
to that side of itself, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale. 
If it was not so, no proposition that is uttered in discourse would be 
believed, until it was examined and tried by reason; and most men 
would be unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of 
what is told them . . . . 
Children, on this supposition, would be absolutely incredulous; and 
therefore absolutely incapable of instruction: those who had little knowl-
edge of human life, and of the manners and characters of men, would 
be in the next degree incredulous: and the most credulous men would 
be those of greatest experience, and of the deepest penetration; because, 
in many cases, they would be able to find good reasons for believing 
the testimony, which the weak and the ignorant could not discover. 
In a word, if credulity were the effect of reasoning and experience, 
it must grow up and gather strength, in the same proportion as reason 
and experience do. But if it is the gift of nature, it will be strongest in 
childhood, and limited and restrained by experience; and the most sup-
erficial view of human life shows, that the last is really the case, and 
not the first. 36 
Corresponding to the credulity principle and giving it relevance there is also 
in human beings, on Reid's view, an innate impulse to assert something only if 
one believes it to be true-a "principle of veracity": 
This principle has a powerful operation, even in the greatest liars; for, 
where they lie once, they speak truth a hundred times. Truth is always 
uppermost, and is the natural issue of the mind. It requires no art of 
training, no inducement or temptation, but only that we yield to a natural 
impulse. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and 
is never practised, even by the worst men, without some temptation. 
Speaking truth is like using our natural food, which we would do from 
appetite, although it answered no end; but lying is like taking physic, 
which is nauseous to the taste, and which no man takes but for some 
end which he cannot otherwise attain. 37 
Reid was of the view that the principle of credulity is "unlimited in children, 
until they meet with instances of deceit and falsehood. "38 Our response to meeting 
with instances of deceit and falsehood is to begin discriminating between reliable 
and unreliable types of speech and to form beliefs about these types which then 
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become available to us as reasons. This has two results. Sometimes the activation 
of the credulity principle is checked by our reasoning that the speech before us 
is probably false because it is of a type which (we have come by induction to 
believe) is unreliable. And sometimes the activation of the credulity principle is 
overwhelmed by our believing what was said for the reason that it is probably 
true, since it is of a type which (we have come by induction to believe) is highly 
reliable. In the one case reasoning checks the activation of the credulity principle 
and in the other case it overwhelms it. But if the principle is neither checked 
nor overwhelmed in a specific case of discerning that someone said something, 
it does its work. Reason, says Reid, 
learns to suspect testimony in some cases, and to disbelieve it in others, 
and sets bounds to that authority to which she is at first entirely subject. 
But still, to the end of life, she finds a necessity of borrowing light 
from testimony, where she has none within herself, and of leaning in 
some degree upon the reason of others, where she is conscious of her 
own imbecility. 
And as in many instances, Reason, even in her maturity, borrows 
aid from testimony; so in others she mutually gives aid to it, and 
strengthens its authority. For as we find good reason to reject testimony 
in some cases, so in others we find good reason to rely upon it with 
perfect security, in our most important concerns. The character, the 
number, and the disinterestedness of witnesses, the impossibility of 
collusion, and the incredibility of their concurring in their testimony 
without collusion, may give an irresistible strength to testimony, com-
pared to which, its native and intrinsic authority is very inconsiderable. 39 
Reid's suggestion, as to why none of us adults displays the unrestrained credulity 
which he attributes to small children, is that on the basis of induction we acquire 
beliefs concerning the reliability and unreliability of types of speech, and that these 
then function as reasons for believing or not believing what people say. But this 
cannot be the whole of the matter. Indeed, it cannot be what is most basic in 
the matter. For to get the inductive practice going we have to judge on independent 
grounds that certain items of speech are true and that certain items are false. 
What accounts for such judgments? Obviously not induction. 
Suppose that by the use of my perceptual faculties I come to believe that the 
window is open-I saw it open, so I believe. But suppose that my mother remarks 
that it was closed. Normally I will believe my eyes rather than my mother. If 
this sort of thing happens often enough, the inductive practice will go to work 
and I will begin to distrust my mother on certain matters (especially if I have 
an explanation in hand for why she speaks falsely on such matters). But what 
accounts for my not believing my mother in the first place? 
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I propose the following model: All of us (after infancy) bring along aframework 
of beliefs to our apprehension of someone saying something. And whether or 
not we believe p on someone's sayso is a function (in part) of what we already 
believe, of how firmly we believe it, of how we came to believe it, and of 
whether or not we believe that p and our current framework of beliefs might 
jointly be true. 
For a given assertion, one's framework of beliefs may contain one or more 
beliefs which function as inhibitors on one's acceptance of what was asserted, 
the inhibitors yielding either disbelief or non-belief. Only if one's belief-
framework were different with respect to this part of its content would one's 
discerning that so-and-so said p operate on one in such a way as to produce in 
one the belief that p. (If the temporal order is reversed, so that first one believes 
on sayso and then one acquires the apparently conflicting belief, then the latter 
belief functions as eliminator rather than inhibitor.) The example already given 
of me, my mother, and the window, is of this sort. But let us have some more 
significant examples before us. Many in the modem world have come to believe 
that miracles cannot occur. Provided this belief is held firmly enough, it acts 
for these persons as an inhibitor on their acceptance of the identity-narrative of 
the gospels. Again, if I firmly believe that my access to the truth or falsehood 
of p is as good as yours, that will usually inhibit my accepting p on your sayso. 
And if Aquinas is right in his discussion of "faith and reason," then the principle 
holds that if p is self-evident to one, then it is impossible for one to accept p 
on someone's sayso. 
Not only do the beliefs that one brings to an episode of someone saying 
something often act as inhibitors. Sometimes they act instead as abettors. That 
is to say, sometimes the beliefs we already have are a crucial component in the 
total circumstance which causes us (with such-and-such firmness) to believe 
something on sayso. Especially beliefs concerning the competence of the speaker 
and beliefs as to the purity of his motivation function thus. Suppose, for example, 
that I believe some mathematical proposition p because of the self-evidence 
dynamic: upon grasping it I both find myself compelled to believe it and have 
that experience classically described as "seeing it to be true." Normally that will 
act as an inhibitor on my accepting not-p on someone's sayso. But if a person 
whom I believe to be a great mathematical genius remarks to me that p is false, 
I might well come to believe that it is false on his sayso. Or again, many believe 
that the gospels are God's revelation, or were inspired by the Holy Spirit. Usually 
such a conviction will not simply be held as a theological belief about scripture 
but will function epistemically as an abettor, leading the person to believe more 
firmly what the gospel writers say than would otherwise have been the case. 
The beliefs we acquire inductively concerning the reliability and unreliability 
of speech types fit directly into this model. The belief that the speech before me 
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belongs to an unreliable type often functions as an inhibitor. And the belief that 
the speech before me is of an unusually reliable type often functions as an abettor. 
Let it be noted that an inhibitor/abettor belief concerning the reliability or 
unreliability of types of speech need not be such that there is some type of which 
I believe that it is reliable (unreliable) and that the speech before me is an example 
of it. It may just be the belief that the speech before me belongs to some reliable 
(unreliable) type or other. And surely the truth is that our actual discriminations 
between specimens of reliable and unreliable types of speech are, in their subtlety, 
far beyond our cognitive ability to single out those types. 
One more supplement to Reid's articulation of his perspective is in order. 
Suppose that upon discerning that someone said p, I believe p on his sayso. 
Suppose further that I believe that his saying p is an example of a highly reliable 
type of speech. It doesn't follow that I believe what he said for the reason that 
it is an example of a highly reliable type of speech (from which I inferred that 
p is probably true-this causing me to believe p itself). It may still be that my 
discerning that he said p produces in me immediately the belief that p, with no 
mediation of reasoning/inference-by the activation of the credulity principle. 
In short, even if I have reasons for believing p on his sayso, my believing him 
may not be reason-grounded. If my belief that his speech is of a reliable type 
functions at all in the situation, it may function as an abettor without functioning 
as a reason. It is my own impression that the credulity principle is less often 
overwhelmed by reasoning than Reid seems to suggest. Even for adults, believing 
on sayso is pervasively the product of our credulity principle. Similar comments 
are to be made, mutatis mutandis, for the working of inhibitors. 
And how does the Lockean thesis look when regarded from a Reidian perspec-
tive? It looks preposterous. We can't even bring it about that all our believing 
on sayso is reason-grounded, let alone bringing it about that all such believing 
has been prefaced by the evidential activity. The reason is not that striving thus 
to eliminate unexamined tradition from our lives conflicts with other duties of 
ours. The reason is that there could not be a human life of this sort. For there 
could not be a human life without a human community. And there could not be 
a human community, nor could persons be inducted into the community, without 
the transmission of beliefs from one person to another by way of the credulity 
principle. It is fantasy to suppose that one could suspend one's acceptance on 
sayso of all that one's fellow human beings have told one and hold it all up to 
judgment. All we can do is stand within our framework of beliefs, many of them 
acquired by believing on sayso, and test some of what has been told us by 
holding it up against other things told us-and now and then test some of it by 
looking, listening, tasting, calculating, reflecting, recalling, etc. Examination of 
tradition is always conducted within tradition unexamined. 
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VIII 
It will be said that this is an outmoded pOlin I. t to be making. Almost no one 
anymore believes the Lockean thesis. Locke's tl":lesis had some plausibility given 
his foundationalism; remove that, and there's little to be said for it. But one 
would have to search long and hard nowadays to find a defender of Locke's 
classical foundationalism. So why belabo:r the point? 
On this occasion I have rejected the Loclkean thesis not for its presumed 
foundationalism but for the reason that it hOiI ds out before us the illusory ideal 
of eradicating from our existence the phenom(!non of immediately believing what 
someone says on their sayso and of replacing it with reason and insight. But let 
us take the objection as a challenge to carry the discussion farther. 
Locke assumed that to be fully entitled to believe on their sayso what someone 
said, one had to believe it for the reason that it appeared more probable than 
not on adequate evidence adequately scrutinized. What about that basic assump-
tion, that entitlement to believing on s.ayso requires believing for a reason. Is 
that correct? To raise this question is t.o touch on issues placed on the agenda 
of Western thought long before Locke--by Socrates and Plato. And let us now, 
as we press this most basic question, also narrow our focus to believing what 
the gospel writers say. What is the re.quired place of Reason and reasons in 
believing their identity-narrative? 
We must first speak a bit about the locus of epistemic obligation. Here we go 
beyond Reid; for Reid speaks almost exclusively about epistemic practices, 
hardly at all about epistemic obligation. Speaking truth, we say to each other 
such things as "You should not have taken her at her word" and "You should 
have believed what she told you." It's tempting to amplify such remarks as "You 
should not have decided to take her at her word" and "You should have decided 
to believe what she told you." But if the Reidian model of belief formation is 
correct, this temptation must be resisted. Beliefs are not the outcome of decisions 
but of dispositions. 
Yet somewhere obligation enters the: picture. Where? At those points where 
we, by decision, can affect the workings of our doxastic practices--can govern 
their workings. What points are those? At least these: By acts of will we can 
direct the attention of our epistemic faculties, by acts of will we can impair or 
improve our epistemic faculties, and by acts of will we can attempt to keep in 
or near the forefront of consciousness something we already believe. 
Not only can we do such things by acts of will; often we ought to do them. 
And often the fact that we have not done them when we ought to have done 
them is reflected in what we do or do not believe on sayso. I ought to have 
reminded myself of the many times this salesman has misled me; I would not 
have taken him at his word if I had. It would not be amiss to express this by 
saying that I ought not to have taken him at his word. 
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Let us say that someone is fully entitled to some belief of theirs if it represents 
no failure of governance-obligations on their part. Naturally many of our beliefs 
are such that we are only partially entitled to them. We have fulfilled some of 
our governance obligations and some not; the belief in question is the outcome 
of that mixture. 
Though an absence of full entitlement is the reflection of some failure of 
proper governance, it must be noted that not all failure of proper governance 
need be reflected in what one believes. It may be that even if one had inquired 
into what one ought to have inquired into, one would still believe exactly as one 
does now, having failed in one's duties. Being right in one's beliefs doesn't 
necessarily get one off the hook. When it comes to epistemic obligation, it is 
not beliefs but activities-governance activities-which are fundamental. 
It's worth taking a moment to distinguish this notion of entitled belief from 
the concept of warranted belief which Alvin Planting a has been analyzing in 
some of his recent writings. 40 Suppose that after adopting the Reidian perspective, 
which pictures all of us human beings, by virtue of our constitution, as engaged 
in a variety of doxastic, dispositionally·-grounded practices, one takes a next step 
of granting that these practices, in a given person, may be working either properly 
or improperly. Then one can introduce the following concept--call it the concept 
of warrant: A belief is warranted for a person just in case the doxastic practices 
by which it was produced were functioning properly in the sort of environment 
for which they were designed. Plantinga theorizes that it is warrant, thus con-
ceived, which constitutes the normative component in our concept of knowledge. 
Once one adopts the Reidian doxastic-practice perspective,.! then one can 
readily recognize and devise a variety of normative concepts applicable to these 
practices. Warrant and entitlement are just two of many. In this paper I confine 
myself to entitlement. It is my judgment that the word "justified," which figures 
so prominently in recent epistemological discussions, suffers the mortal defect 
of being ambiguous as between warrant and entitlement. For that reason I have 
avoided it-as I have also avoided the word "rational" as synonym for "entitled." 
"Rational" connotes Reason and reasons; how entitlement is connected to those 
is a question to be raised. 
Let us now make the somewhat questionable assumption that it is within one's 
powers of governance either to not believe the gospel writers on their say so or to do 
so for reasons. Ought one to do so? Is this one of our obligations? If the believer 
does not believe for a reason, does it follow that he has not fulfilled his governance-
obligations? I see no reason to answer "Yes" to these questions. Believing on say 
so need not in general be rationally grounded-cannot be. Why would this case be 
different? Why would it be wrong in this case to let that fundamental and indispens-
able component of our constitution, the credulity principle, do its work? 
Normally if we want to know whether the believer has fulfilled her governance-
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obligations it will pay to look in a different direction. Has she reflected as much as 
she ought on potential defeaters? If she had, would her belief-system have contained 
an inhibitor on her belief? Is she entitled to not have an inhibitor? When there's 
something wrong about somebody's believing something on sayso, usually what's 
wrong is not that their believing is not rationally grounded but that, ifthey had done 
what they ought to have done, they would believe less firmly, or not at all: Their 
belief-system would contain an inhibitor on this believing of theirs. And sometimes 
it would contain an abettor; they would believe more firmly than they do. Naturally 
this last point applies to the gospel case too. 
Some will feel dismay over my rejection of the need for rational grounding 
and my embrace of the credulity principle as an entirely acceptable dynamic for 
believing the gospel writers. But if so, then reflecting on the character of the 
reasons relevant to such cases should evoke a dismay which is a sibling of this 
dismay. Fundamentally, all reasons for believing on their sayso what someone 
says are reasons to the effect that the person's speech is of a reliable sort. As 
already observed, these reliability-reasons are of two kinds. 
(1) One believes that the speech before one belongs to some reliable type or 
other. 
(2) There is some speech-type of which one believes that it is reliable and that 
the speech before one is an example of it. 
Consider a reason of sort (1). One might hold (1) for a reason, a good reason; 
if so, that reason is presumably a belief of type (2). But one might also hold it 
immediately. Experience will have developed in one a certain belief-disposition; 
and the activation of that disposition on this occasion immediately produces in 
one the belief. But to judge such a belief an acceptable reason for believing-and 
often we would not be able to give any other-is to give one's blessing to a 
belief-disposition which, like the credulity-disposition, does not yield insight. 
Suppose on the other hand that one's reason is of the second sort. Then the 
question is how one came to believe, of a certain speech type, that it is reliable. 
Certain logical inferences might of course be involved. But at a certain point, 
if the belief has been formed properly, one comes back to the fact that one has 
tested for reliability a certain sample of the type and made an inference from 
the sample to the type as a whole. Either that, or one believes someone who 
tells one that the type is reliable-in which case all the same considerations 
apply to that person's speech (unless) one believes that the someone in question 
who tells one that the type is reliable cannot speak falsely, for example, believing 
that God tells one that all of Scripture is reliable. Now if the inference from 
sample to type is to be reliable, the sample has to be representative. But as 
Hume observed, in the nature of the case neither reason nor any other mode of 
insight tells one that it is. The inductive practice is like the credulity-disposition 
in that it is not a species of reason or insight. That ancient beckoning vision, of 
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grounding our beliefs entirely on reason, or on reason supplemented with other 
modes of direct insight into reality, must be surrendered-even if we believe 
that here and there we do have such insight. 
I have not contended that it is wrong for believers to believe for reasons. Nor 
have I contended that it is never obligatory for them to do so. Neither have I 
denied that there are some legitimate projects for which even something like the 
evidential activity is the required or appropriate implementation. I have only 
contended that it is not in general obligatory for Christian believers to believe 
the identity-narrative of the gospels for reasons. Christian belief does not have 
to be rationally grounded. But let it be observed once more that the fideism, or 
more strictly, the anti-evidentialism, which I have been defending (a near-relative 
of what Alvin Plantinga has called "Reformed epistemology") is not a form of 
dogmatism. For I have assumed that for some Christians, at least, there are 
certain objections lodged against the truth of the gospels of which they ought to 
take note and on whose cogency they ought adequately to reflect. Failure to do 
so may deprive their belief of entitlement. 
Carrying out these obligations will require a good deal of reasoning. Sometimes 
it may even require the evidential activity or something rather like it. So reason, 
reasons, and reasoning are not irrelevant to the obligations of the believer. The 
question which naturally arises is whether it is possible to give some general 
description of their relevance, or more generally, some general formula for the 
governance-obligations relevant to believing the identity-narrative of the gospel 
writers on their say so. Gary Gutting has argued that religious believers are required 
to justify their believing to certain of those who disagree with them, on pain of no 
longer being entitled to their belief. Hans Albert has argued that religious believers 
are obligated to look for refutations of their beliefs; they are entitled to their beliefs 
only if, while looking for refutations, they have not found any .42 And there are yet 
other proposals which have been made. None of those with which I am acquainted 
appears to me satisfactory. Nor have I anything to put in their place. 
But perhaps what we need is a new model for our thought about these matters-a 
model more like that emerging from some recent discussions of practical ration-
ality and hermeneutics. Perhaps every community operates with a whole texture 
of rules for proper governance which it then teaches to its young members. 
Perhaps these rules are usually at some points contested within the community, 
perhaps they change with more or less rapidity under a wide variety of pressures, 
and perhaps different communities operate with different such rules. And perhaps 
a given society'S rules must be appraised not by reference to some "eternal" 
rules but by reference to how well the rules in question serve the flourishing, 
the shalom, of that community. Of course, the question of what constitutes the 
flourishing of a given community, and of communities in general, is also not 
without dispute. Following out these beckoning paths for reflection will have to 
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remain the project for some other occasion. 
"No matter what the logic ofthe Christian faith," says Hans Frei in one place, 
"actual belief in the resurrection is a matter of faith and not of arguments from 
possibility or evidence. "43 To this he adds in another place, "I am well aware 
of, but not terribly distressed by, the fact that my refusal to speak speculatively 
or evidentially about the resurrection of Christ, while nevertheless affirming it 
as an indispensable Christian claim may involve me in some difficult logical 
tangles. "44 Frei' s intuitions were more reliable than his apprehensions. 
Frei speaks of faith; I have not. But faith does indeed enter the picture. One 
cannot believe the identity-narrative of the gospel writers without feeling called 
to believe in him of whom the narrative speaks-to have faith in him. The 
difficulty of doing that constitutes for many the great inhibitor. Perhaps to explain 
why some respond in faith and some do not, we must appeal to more than "flesh 
and blood"-to the working of the Spirit. For we touch mystery here. Two 
persons have the same objections. For the one, those objections inhibit accep-
tance. For the other, acceptance overcomes those objections. 
IX 
Our problems with traditions remain. The Enlightenment did not dispose of 
them. Traditions are still the source of benightedness, chicanery, and oppression. 
And our moral and religious traditions are more fractured today than ever before. 
In this situation, examining our traditions remains for many of us a deep obliga-
tion-and for all of us together a desperate need. But we shall have to make do 
without grand theses as to who ought to conduct what modes of examination. 
And we shall have to acknowledge what the thinkers of the Enlightenment would 
have found appallingly unpalatable: That examination of tradition can only take 
place in the context of unexamined tradition. 
By formulating and publicizing their governance thesis, the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment hoped to bring about a rational consensus in place of fractured 
tradition. That hope has failed. In my judgment it was bound to fail. Sometimes 
epistemology does pry people loose from their worldview or religion; just as 
often, their worldview or religion pries them loose from a certain epistemology. 
Yet we must live together. It is to politics and not to epistemology that we 
shall have to look for an answer as to how to do that. "Liberal" politics has 
fallen on bad days recently. But to its animating vision of a society in which 
persons of diverse traditions live together in justice and friendship, conversing 
with each other and slowly altering their traditions in response to their conversa-
tion-to that, there is no viable alternative. 
Yale University & Free University afAmsterdam 
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